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Nor would we be satisfied with a biology teacher who understood the 
arguments and evidence involved in, say, the National Academy of 
Sciences‟ (1984) discussion of evolution, but who, outside of the 
classroom, subscribed to a creationist view of the origin of species. 
(Kennedy, 1998: 259) 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I suspect that for many science educators, whether or not they have any 
religious beliefs themselves, the relationships between science and religion, 
i.e. the „science/religion issue‟, appears somewhat outside the scope of 
science education. However, a range of factors, including a greater 
awareness of the benefits of dealing explicitly in the school classroom with the 
nature of science and the increasing significance of creationism, suggests that 
this perspective may be too narrow. In this article I begin by examining the 
nature of science and the nature of religion before looking generally at the 
ways in which science and religion relate to one another. I then look at a 
number of case studies the centre on the relationships between science and 
religion (strictly, theology), including attempts to find mechanisms for divine 
action in quantum theory and chaos theory, creationism, genetic engineering 
and the writings of Richard Dawkins. These case studies are chosen both 
because of their significance in the science/religion debate and because of 
what they can tell us of the more general issues. Finally, I consider some of 
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the pedagogical issues that would need to be considered if the 
science/religion issue is to be addressed in the classroom. 
 
I conclude that there are increasing arguments in favour of science educators 
(a term I take to include all those concerned with the teaching or 
communication of science, including teachers of science in school at both 
primary (5-7 to 11-13 years of age) and secondary (11-13 to 16-19 years of 
age) levels as well as those involved in some sectors of informal science 
teaching, for example in natural history museums) teaching about the 
science/religion issue. The principal reason for this is to help students (a term 
I shall use to indicate those being taught, whatever their age and whether 
their science education is formal or informal) better to learn science. However, 
such teaching makes greater demands on science educators than has 
generally been the case. Certain of these demands are identified and some 
specific suggestions are made as to how a science educator might deal with 
the science/religion issue. At the same time, this paper is most certainly not 
intended to be the final word on the subject and I close with some suggestions 
for further research. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 
 
Readers of this journal are not likely to need a long treatment of the nature of 
science. However, my argument relies on some agreement as to the nature of 
science and any treatment of the science/religion issue surely requires an 
examination of both the nature of science and the nature of religion. I will 
highlight what I hope are a number of relatively uncontroversial points that are 
germane to the science/religion issue. Although I have suggested elsewhere 
that the way in which science is conceptualised (Reiss, 1993) and 
represented (Reiss, 2002) in schools is generally too narrow, my argument 
here does not depend on the validity of these suggestions. Here I am 
searching for consensus not staking a particular claim. 
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The phrase „the nature of science‟ is used as a shorthand for something like 
„how science is done and what sorts of things scientists work on‟. It therefore 
contains two elements: the practice of doing science and the knowledge that 
results. 
 
 
What do scientists study? 
 
It is difficult to come up with a definitive answer to the question „What do 
scientists study?‟. Certain things clearly fall under the domain of science – the 
nature of electricity, the arrangement of atoms into molecules, and human 
physiology, to give three examples. However, what about the origin of the 
universe, the behaviour of people in society, decisions about whether we 
should build nuclear power plants or go for wind power, the appreciation of 
music and the nature of love, for example? Do these fall under the domain of 
science? Although a small proportion of people, including a few prominent 
scientists, would not only argue „yes‟ but maintain that all meaningful 
questions fall within the domain of science, most people hold that science is 
but one form of knowledge and that other forms of knowledge complement 
science. 
 
This way of thinking means that the origin of the universe is also a 
philosophical or religious question – or simply unknowable; the behaviour of 
people in society requires knowledge of the social sciences (including 
psychology and sociology) rather than only of the natural sciences; whether 
we should go for nuclear or wind power is partly a scientific issue but also 
requires an understanding of economics, risk and politics; the appreciation of 
music and the nature of love, while clearly having something to do with our 
perceptual apparatuses and our evolutionary history, cannot be reduced to 
science (Reiss, 2005). 
 
While historians tell us that what scientists study changes over time, there are 
reasonable consistencies: 
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 Science is concerned with the natural world and with certain elements 
of the manufactured world – so that, for example, the laws of gravity 
apply as much to artificial satellites as they do to planets and stars. 
 Science is concerned with how things are rather than with how they 
should be. So there is a science of gunpowder and in vitro fertilisation 
without science telling us whether warfare and test-tube births are good 
or bad. 
 
 
How is science done? 
 
If it is difficult to come up with a definitive answer to the question „What do 
scientists study?‟ it is even more difficult to come up with a clear-cut answer to 
the question „How is science done?‟. As is well known, Robert Merton 
characterised science as open-minded, universalist, disinterested and 
communal (Merton, 1973). For Merton, science is a group activity: even 
though certain scientists work on their own, all scientists contribute to a single 
body of knowledge accepted by the community of scientists. There are certain 
parallels here with art, literature and music. After all, Leonardo da Vinci, 
Michelangelo and Raphael all contributed to Renaissance art. But while it 
makes no sense to try to combine their paintings, science is largely about 
combining the contributions of many different scientists to produce an overall 
coherent model of one aspect of reality. In this sense, science is disinterested; 
in this sense it is (or should be) impersonal.  
 
Of course, individual scientists are passionate about their work and often slow 
to accept that their cherished ideas are wrong. But science itself is not 
persuaded by such partiality. While there may be controversy about whether 
the poems of Ezra Pound or those of T. S. Eliot are better (and the question is 
somewhat meaningless anyway), time invariably shows which of two 
alternative scientific theories is nearer the truth. For this reason, scientists are 
well advised to retain „open mindedness‟, always being prepared to change 
their views in the light of new evidence or better explanatory theories, and 
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science itself advances over time. As a result, while some scientific 
knowledge („frontier science‟) is contentious, much scientific knowledge can 
confidently be relied on: it is relatively certain. 
 
Karl Popper emphasised the falsifiability of scientific theories (Popper, 
1934/1972): unless you can imagine collecting data that would allow you to 
refute a theory, the theory isn‟t scientific. The same applies to scientific 
hypotheses. So, iconically, the hypothesis „All swans are white‟ is scientific 
because we can imagine finding a bird that is manifestly a swan (in terms of 
its anatomy and behaviour) but is not white. Indeed, this is precisely what 
happened when early white explorers returned from Australia with tales of 
black swans. 
 
Popper‟s ideas easily give rise to a view of science in which knowledge 
accumulates over time as new theories are proposed and new data collected 
to discriminate between conflicting theories. Much school experimentation in 
science is Popperian in essence: we see a rainbow and hypothesise that 
white light is split up into light of different colours as it is refracted through a 
transparent medium (water droplets); we test this by attempting to refract 
white light through a glass prism; we find the same colours of the rainbow are 
produced and our hypothesis is confirmed. Until some new evidence causes it 
to be falsified, we accept it. 
 
There is much of value in the work of Thomas Merton and Karl Popper but 
most academics in the field would argue that there is more to the nature of 
science. Thomas Kuhn made a number of seminal contributions but he is 
most remembered nowadays by his argument that while the Popperian 
account of science holds well during periods of normal science when a single 
paradigm holds sway, such as the Ptolemaic model of the structure of the 
solar system (in which the Earth is at the centre) or the Newtonian 
understanding of motion and gravity, it breaks down when a scientific crisis 
occurs (Kuhn, 1970). At the time of such a crisis, a scientific revolution 
happens during which a new paradigm, such as the Copernican model of the 
structure of the solar system or Einstein‟s theory of relativity, begins to replace 
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(initially to co-exist with) the previously accepted paradigm. The central point 
is that the change of allegiance from scientists believing in one paradigm to 
their believing in another cannot, Kuhn argues, be fully explained by the 
Popperian account of falsifiability. 
 
Kuhn likens the switch from one paradigm to another to a gestalt switch (when 
we suddenly see something in a new way) or even a religious conversion. As 
Alan Chalmers puts it: 
 
There will be no purely logical argument that demonstrates the 
superiority of one paradigm over another and that thereby compels a 
rational scientist to make the change. One reason why no such 
demonstration is possible is the fact that a variety of factors are involved 
in a scientist‟s judgment of the merits of a scientific theory. An individual 
scientist‟s decision will depend on the priority he or she gives to the 
various factors. The factors will include such things as simplicity, the 
connection with some pressing social need, the ability to solve some 
specified kind of problem, and so on. Thus one scientist might be 
attracted to the Copernican theory because of the simplicity of certain 
mathematical features of it. Another might be attracted to it because in it 
there is the possibility of calendar reform. A third might have been 
deterred from adopting the Copernican theory because of an 
involvement with terrestrial mechanics and an awareness of the 
problems that the Copernican theory posed for it. 
(Chalmers, 1999: 115-116) 
 
Kuhn also argued that scientific knowledge is validated by its acceptance in a 
community of scientists. Often scientists change their views as new evidence 
persuades them that a previously held theory is wrong. But sometimes they 
cling obstinately to cherished theories. In such cases, if these scientists are 
powerful (e.g. by controlling which papers get published in the most 
prestigious journals), scientific progress may be impeded – until the scientists 
in question retire or die. 
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A useful development of Kuhn‟s work was provided by Lakatos (1978) who 
argued that scientists work within research programmes. A research 
programme consists of a set of core beliefs surrounded by layers of less 
central beliefs. Scientists are willing to accept changes to these more 
peripheral beliefs so long as the core beliefs can be defended. So, in biology, 
we might see in contemporary genetics a core belief in the notion that 
development proceeds via a set of interactions between the actions of genes 
and the influences of the environment. At one point, it was thought that the 
passage from DNA to RNA was unidirectional. Now we know (reverse 
transcriptase, etc.) that this is not always the case. The core belief (that 
development proceeds via a set of interactions between the actions of genes 
and the influences of the environment) remains unchanged but the less 
central belief (that the passage from DNA to RNA is unidirectional) is 
abandoned. If you consider that science education should not consider the 
science/religion issue my hope is that is a peripheral rather than a core belief 
and that this article will help you change your mind. 
 
The above account of the nature of science portrays science as what John 
Ziman (2000) has termed „academic science‟. Ziman argues that such a 
portrayal was reasonably valid between about 1850 and 1950 in European 
and American universities but that since then we have entered a phase 
largely characterised by „post-academic science‟. Post-academic science is 
increasingly transdisciplinary and utilitarian, with a requirement to produce 
value for money; it is characterised by limits to the growth in the number of 
scientists; it is more influenced by politics; it is more industrialised; and it is 
more bureaucratic. 
 
The effect of these changes is to make the boundaries around the city of 
science a bit fuzzier. It is not to deny that there is a city but to question the 
absoluteness of the distinction between city and countryside, between 
monarch and subject, between the judiciary and the executive. Of course, if 
one accepts the contributions of the social study of science (e.g. Yearley, 
2005) one finds these boundaries fuzzier still. As I promised above, my 
argument does not rely on such a reading of science though someone who is 
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persuaded by the „Strong Programme‟ within the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (i.e. the notion that even valid scientific theories are amenable to 
sociological investigation) is much more likely to accept the worth of science 
educators considering the importance of religion as one of many factors that 
influence the way science is practised and scientific knowledge produced. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF RELIGION 
 
Although one can argue as to whether there is just one science, it is clear that 
there are many religions. It is rather difficult to answer the question 'What is 
the nature of religion?' in a way that satisfies the members of all religions. 
Nevertheless, the following, derived from Smart (1989) and Hinnells (1991), 
are generally characteristic of most religions. 
 
Religions have a practical and ritual dimension that encompasses such 
elements as worship, preaching, prayer, yoga, meditation and other 
approaches to stilling the self. 
 
The experiential and emotional dimension of religions has at one pole the rare 
visions given to some of the crucial figures in a religion's history, such as that 
of Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita and the revelation to Moses at the burning 
bush in Exodus. At the other pole are the experiences and emotions of many 
religious adherents, whether a once-in-a-lifetime apprehension of the 
transcendent or a more frequent feeling of the presence of God either in 
corporate worship or in the stillness of one's heart. 
 
All religions hand down, whether orally or in writing, vital stories that comprise 
the narrative or mythic dimension, for example the story of the six day 
creation in the Judaeo-Christian scriptures. For some religious adherents 
such stories are believed literally, for others they are understood symbolically. 
 
The doctrinal and philosophical dimension arises, in part, from the 
narrative/mythic dimension as theologians within a religion struggle to 
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integrate these stories into a more general view of the world. Thus the early 
Christian church came to its understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity by 
combining the central truth of the Jewish religion – that there is but one God – 
with its understanding of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ and the working 
of the Holy Spirit. 
 
If doctrine attempts to define the beliefs of a community of believers, the 
ethical and legal dimension regulates how believers act. So Sunni Islam has 
its Five Pillars – Shahada (testimony of faith), Salat (prayer), Zakat (alms-
giving), Sawm (fasting) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) – while Judaism has 
the Ten Commandments and other regulations in the Torah and Buddhism its 
Five Precepts. 
 
The social and institutional dimension of a religion relates to its corporate 
manifestation. For example the Sangha – the order of monks and nuns 
founded by the Buddha to carry on the teaching of the Dharma – in Buddhism, 
the umma' – the whole Muslim community – in Islam, and the Church – the 
communion of believers comprising the body of Christ – in Christianity. 
 
Finally, there is the material dimension to each religion, namely the fruits of 
religious belief as shown by places of worship (e.g. synagogues, temples and 
churches), religious artefacts (e.g. Eastern Orthodox icons and Hindu statues) 
and sites of special meaning (e.g. the river Ganges, Mount Fuji and Eyre's 
Rock). 
 
This overview of the nature of religion is even shorter than the one I provided 
for science. It is clear, though, that there can be a number of axes on which 
the science/religion issue can be examined. For example, the effects of the 
practical and ritual dimension are being investigated by scientific studies that 
examine such things as the efficacy of prayer and the neurological 
consequences of meditation (e.g. Lee & Newberg, 2005); a number of 
analyses of religious faith, informed by contemporary understandings of 
evolutionary psychology, behavioural ecology and sociobiology, examine the 
possibility or conclude that religious faith can be explained by science (e.g. 
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Reynolds & Tanner, 1983; Hinde, 1999; Dennett, 2006); the narrative/mythic 
dimension of religion clearly connects (in ways that will be examined below) 
with scientific accounts of such matters as the origins of the cosmos and the 
evolution of life; the doctrinal and philosophical dimension can lead to 
understandings that may agree or disagree with standard scientific ones (e.g. 
about the status of the human embryo); and the ethical and legal dimension 
can lead to firm views about such matters as land ownership, usury and 
euthanasia. Perhaps only the social and institutional and the material 
dimensions of religion are relatively distinct from the world of science 
(understand, once again, as the natural sciences rather than more broadly). 
 
As will be discussed in the next section, the relationship between science and 
religion has changed over the years (Brooke, 1991; Al-Hayani, 2005; 
Szerszynski, 2005); indeed, the use of the singular, „relationship‟, risks giving 
the impression that there is only one way in which the two relate. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are two key issues: one is to do with 
understandings of reality; the other to do with evidence and authority. 
Although it is always desperately difficult to generalise (difficult in the sense 
that one lays oneself open to accusations that one hasn‟t considered every 
particular – and yet the alternative is to be submerged in a weight of detail 
that would surely suffocate all but the most devoted / obsessive of readers), 
most religions hold that reality consists of more than the objective world and 
many religions give weight to personal and/or (depending on the religion) 
institutional authority in a way that science generally strives not to. For 
example, there is a very large religious and theological literature on the world 
to come, i.e. life after death, (e.g. Hick, 1976/1985). However, to labour the 
point, science, strictly speaking, has little or nothing to say about this 
question, while many religious believers within a particular religion are likely to 
find the pronouncements on the question of even the most intelligent and 
spiritual of their present leaders to be of less significance than the few 
recorded words of their religion‟s founder(s). 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
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There is now a very large literature on the relationship between science and 
religion. Indeed, the journal Zygon specialises in this area (see also Science & 
Christian Belief, amongst others). A frequent criticism by those who write in 
this area (e.g. Roszak, 1994) is of what they see as simplistic analyses of the 
area by those, often renowned scientists, who write occasionally about it. 
Indeed, it is frequently argued that the clergy both in the past and nowadays 
are often far more sympathetic to a standard scientific view on such matters 
as evolution than might be supposed (e.g. Colburn & Henriques, 2006). 
 
A particularly thorough historical study of the relationship between science 
and religion is provided by John Hedley Brooke (1991). Brooke‟s aim is “to 
reveal something of the complexity of the relationship between science and 
religion as they have interacted in the past” (p.321). He concludes: 
 
Popular generalizations about that relationship, whether couched in 
terms of war or peace, simply do not stand up to serious investigation. 
There is no such thing as the relationship between science and religion. 
It is what different individuals and communities have made of it in a 
plethora of different contexts. Not only has the problematic interface 
between them shifted over time, but there is also a high degree of 
artificiality in abstracting the science and the religion of earlier centuries 
to see how they were related. 
(Brooke, 1991: 321) 
 
Perhaps the best known categorisation of the ways in which the relationship 
between science and religion can be understood is provided by Ian Barbour 
(1990). Barbour, who focuses especially on epistemological assumptions of 
recent Western authors, identifies four main groupings. 
 
First, there is the relationship of conflict; „first‟ simply because it is the first in 
Barbour‟s list and first, perhaps, also in the minds of many modernists who do 
not have a religious faith. Barbour doesn‟t give a reason for the order of his 
listing but at least two can be suggested: comprehensibility and familiarity. It is 
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both easy and familiar (given Barbour‟s declared focus on recent Western 
authors) to see the relationship between science and religion as one of 
conflict. As, though, one might expect from a professor of science, technology 
and society giving the Gifford lectures (the result of an 1885 bequest of 
£80,000 “for the establishment of a series of lectures dealing with the topic of 
natural religion” (Gifford lectures, 2006)), Barbour sees limitations in this way 
of understanding the science/religion issue. As he memorably puts it: 
 
In a fight between a boa constrictor and a wart-hog, the victor, whichever 
it is, swallows the vanquished. In scientific materialism, science 
swallows religion. In biblical literalism, religion swallows science. The 
fight can be avoided if they occupy separate territories or if, as I will 
suggest, they each pursue more appropriate diets. 
(Barbour, 1990: 4) 
 
Barbour‟s second grouping is independence (e.g. Gould, 1999). Science and 
religion may be seen as independent for two main reasons: because they use 
distinctive methods or because they function as different languages. In any 
event, the result is that each is seen as distinct from the other and as enjoying 
its own autonomy: 
 
Each has its own distinctive domain and its characteristic methods that 
can be justified on its own terms. Proponents of this view say there are 
two jurisdictions and each party must keep off the other‟s turf. Each must 
tend to its own business and not meddle in the affairs of the others. 
Each mode of inquiry is selective and has its limitations. 
(Barbour, 1990: 10) 
 
Barbour‟s third grouping moves beyond conflict and independence to dialogue 
(cf. Berry, 1988; Watts, 1998; Williams, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2005). As an 
example of dialogue, Barbour points out how our understanding of astronomy 
has forced us to ask why the initial conditions were present that allowed the 
universe to evolve. The point is not that the findings of science require a 
religious faith – that would be for the wart-hog of religion to swallow the boa 
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constrictor of science. Rather the point is that scientific advances can give rise 
(no claim is made that they do for all people) to religious questions, so that a 
dialogue ensues. 
 
Barbour‟s final grouping is one in which the relationship between science and 
religion is seen to be one of integration (cf. Polkinghorne, 1994; Peacocke, 
2001). For example, in natural theology it is held that the existence of God 
can be deduced from aspects of nature rather than from revelation or religious 
experience (e.g. Ray, 1691/2005). Natural theology has rather fallen out of 
favour (but see Polkinghorne, 2006). A more modern version is process 
theology which rejects a view of the world in which purely natural events 
(characterised by an absence of divine activity) are interspersed with 
occasional gaps where God acts. Rather, for process theologians, every 
event is understood “to be jointly the product of the entity‟s past, its own 
action, and the action of God” (Barbour, 1990: 29). Furthermore, God is not 
the Unmoved Mover of Thomas Aquinas but instead acts reciprocally with the 
world. 
 
There is a danger in finishing with the model of integration that the impression 
is given that I consider this is the „best‟ model. That is not my intention. 
Indeed, when I eventually turn to consider pedagogical implications I will 
argue that there is considerable value in students even-handedly being 
introduced to a range of models as worthy contenders. 
 
One strand of research within science education that is relevant to the issue 
of the relationship between science and religion has concerned itself with 
empirical work on how students of school or college age conceptualise this 
relationship either in general or with reference to particular topics such as 
evolution (e.g. Ingram & Nelson, 2006). Koul (2003), for example, obtained 
survey data from 492 12th grade students and interview data from 53 students 
of the same age in the western edge of the Himalayas in Chamba district, 
Himachal Preadesh, India. The survey responses were generally consistent 
with what Koul regarded as “an idealized view of science” (p.113). For 
example, 89% of the students regarded science as „a systematic study of the 
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natural world‟ with 71% of them seeing scientific knowledge as „always 
objective‟. They saw clear differences between science and religion in some 
respects – for example, 91% held that „Scientific theories can be tested‟ 
whereas only 24% held that „Religious beliefs can be tested‟, and only 31% 
felt that „Scientific methods should be applied to religion‟ and even fewer, 
21%, that „Religious methods should be applied to science‟ – but not in 
others. For example, 43% held that „Scientific outlook requires open 
mindedness‟ and 45% that „Religious outlook requires open mindedness‟. 
 
The interviews in Koul‟s study, as one might expect, offered “a more subtle 
and complex picture” (p. 114). In particular, few students saw a clear-cut 
distinction between science and religion. For example: 
 
During her interview, Amrita (all student names are pseudonyms) stated 
that scientific theories describe the material aspects of nature while 
dharmic theories describe principles according to which authentic Hindu 
life can and should be lived. She developed this statement by saying 
that science only recognizes the material nature of physical reality 
whereas Hinduism recognizes physical reality as a symbol of an 
inexhaustible, transcendental power of Nature. Amrita refers to water, 
trees, mountains, animals, and earth as entities that communicate and 
aspect of this transcendental power. 
 
Scientific theories describe properties of liquids, gases, 
compounds while dharmic theories tell us about beauty and 
power of nature….science is about usefulness while dharma 
is about the power of different animals, the powers of gods 
and goddesses 
(Koul, 2003: 116) 
 
 
QUANTUM THEORY, CHAOS THEORY AND DIVINE ACTION 
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The post-Newtonian advent in the early twentieth century of quantum theory 
and, later in the same century, of chaos theory has led many to wonder 
whether within either or both of these two frameworks might lie a space for 
divine action in a way that does not contradict the scientific worldview in the 
way that miracles seem to. For almost anyone who does not work 
professionally within quantum physics, it is exceptionally difficult to 
understand what is going on that is relevant to the science/religion issue but a 
core concept is that of determinism, which results from the issue of the 
relationship of measurement to reality (e.g. Osborn, 2005). 
 
As is well known, in 1927 Heisenberg agued that key physical variables (e.g. 
the position and momentum of an object) are linked. Measuring the one to a 
very high degree of precision necessarily means that the other cannot be so 
precisely determined. Thus far there is not a great deal that is of interest to 
the non-physicist – the issue appears to be one of epistemology. However: 
 
Heisenberg himself took a more radical view – he saw this limitation as a 
property of nature rather than an artefact of experimentalism. This 
radical interpretation of uncertainty as an ontological principle of 
indeterminism implies that quantum mechanics is inherently statistical – 
it deals with probabilities rather than well-defined classical trajectories. 
Such a view is clearly inimical to classical determinism. 
(Osborn, 2005: 132) 
 
Put somewhat loosely, a number of people have tried to find room for divine 
action in this indeterminancy. No consensus yet exists as to the validity of this 
search though, on balance, the current views seems to be that such a search 
is mistaken for reasons both of theology and of physics. A particularly helpful, 
though demanding, analysis of both the theology and the physics is provided 
by Saunders (2002). Beginning with the theology, Saunders draws on the 
widespread distinction between general and special forms of divine action. In 
the words of Michael Langford general divine action is “the government of the 
universe through the universal laws that control or influence nature, man, and 
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history, without the need for specific or ad hoc acts of divine will” (Langford, 
1981: 11). On the other hand, special divine action is characterised by: 
 
Those actions of God that pertain to a particular time and place in 
creation as distinct from another. This is a broad category and includes 
the traditional understanding of „miracles‟, the notion of particular 
providence, responses to intercessionary prayer, God‟s personal 
actions, and some forms of religious experience. 
(Saunders, 2002: 20) 
 
Oversimplifying considerably, and eliding over a thousand years of theology in 
the Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Islamic and Sikh traditions, all religions 
are comfortable with the notion of general divine action but they differ both 
among and within themselves considerably in their understanding of specific 
divine action. In particular, many leading theologians (but see Pannenberg, 
2006) are uncomfortable with the notion of specific divine action so defined for 
a number of reasons including the particular problems for the occurrence of 
suffering that it raises (if suffering can sometimes be averted miraculously, 
why isn‟t it always?) and the apparent shortcomings, including capriciousness, 
suggested by a divine who relies on occasional exercises of supernatural 
activity to keep things moving along. 
 
Going onto the physics, Saunders is sceptical of attempts to locate the 
possibility of specific divine action in quantum or chaos theory. The argument 
here becomes even more technical and depends, in respect of quantum 
theory, on whether one accepts the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of 
reality (in which Schrödinger‟s cat is either dead or alive before the box is 
opened) or the more radical interpretation (in which the cat is both dead and 
alive). In both cases, though, and in the case of chaos theory (sometimes 
termed „complexity theory‟ on the grounds that it deals with systems that are 
deterministic but unpredictable on the grounds of their exquisite sensitivity to 
small changes in their initial conditions) Saunders rejects attempts to find 
opportunities for specific divine activity in the science. 
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EVOLUTION AND CREATIONISM 
 
For reasons that delight some and appall others, creationism is growing in 
extent and influence, both in the UK and elsewhere. Definitions of creationism 
vary but about 40% of adults in the USA and at least 10% in the UK believe 
that the Earth is only some 10,000 years old, that it came into existence as 
described in the early parts of the Bible or the Qu‟ran and that the most that 
evolution has done is to change species into closely related species (see 
Miller et al. (2006) and enter “creationism evolution poll” into a Search 
Engine). This understanding of creationism is best described as young-Earth 
creationism as other versions (including old-Earth creationism and 
progressive creationism) exist. However, although hard data are in short 
supply, it is clear that the creationism movement is clearly currently dominated 
by young-Earth creationists. (Creationism, of whatever sort, is not the same 
as the belief that there is a creator. Many people hold that the world has such 
a creator without being creationists.) For a creationist it is possible that the 
various species of zebra had a common ancestor but this is not the case for 
zebras, bears and antelopes – still less for monkeys and humans, for birds 
and reptiles or for fish and fir trees. 
 
Those who advocate intelligent design, a theory that has only really been 
around since the 1990s but has grown hugely in political influence since then, 
generally make no reference to the scriptures or a deity in their arguments but 
maintain that the intricacy of the order we see in the natural world, including at 
a sub-cellular level, provides strong evidence for the existence of an 
intelligence behind this. An undirected process, such as natural selection, is 
held to be inadequate (e.g. Behe, 1996, 2003; Dembski, 1998, 2003; 
Johnson, 1999). 
 
To an evolutionist, the Earth is some 4600 million years old and all organisms 
share a common ancestor. Indeed, if you go back far enough, life had its 
ancestry in inorganic molecules. Furthermore, an evolutionary understanding 
of the world is fundamental to biology and many other aspects of science. For 
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an evolutionist, for us to understand ourselves, the other organisms and the 
world about us requires an evolutionary perspective (Ayala, 2006). 
 
Creationism, Darwinian evolution and intelligent design can be contrasted by 
means of a classic example: the mammalian eye. For the creationist, there is, 
of course, nothing to explain. God can create the human eye, as a whole 
universe, out of nothing and in no time at all. Darwin (1859), though, was well 
aware that the mammalian eye, with its fine adaptations and its wonderful 
fitness for purpose, was a problem for his theory. Darwin was unable to point 
to a fossil history. Instead he appealed to a variety of organisms alive today 
that have light-detecting structures that differ hugely in complexity. He 
reasoned that we could imagine an eye evolving from a simple predecessor to 
its present mammalian complexity. For intelligent designers, though, this still 
leaves open the question of how even a „simple‟ light-detecting structure 
came into being. Intelligent designers maintain that when we look at the 
biochemistry of the simplest such structures, there is a wealth of intricate 
detail, a certain „irreducible complexity‟, that argues for intelligent design. 
 
Most of the literature on creationism (and/or intelligent design) and 
evolutionary theory puts them in stark opposition. (Evolutionary theory here 
and from now on is understood as outlined above; everyone is comfortable 
with the notion that natural selection and possibly other mechanisms are 
responsible for small-scale evolutionary change.) Of course, even before the 
advent of intelligent design, there were non-creationist accounts that 
attempted to disprove Darwinism (e.g. Macbeth, 1974; Hitching, 1982). From 
the creationist camp, there are a huge number of books and a number of 
journals devoted to extolling creationism and execrating evolution. It is easy 
for scientists and science educators, perhaps especially those with no 
religious faith, to ignore or dismiss such views as worthless but it is important 
to recognise the vigour with which they are held. After all, imagine you 
(assuming you are not a creationist) genuinely believed that the theory of 
evolution was not only factually incorrect but led to increased immorality and 
the loss of eternal salvation for anyone who believed it, wouldn‟t you fight 
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passionately against it? For an analysis by an academic psychologist of why 
creationism is here to stay see Evans (2000). 
 
Evolution is consistently presented in creationist books and articles as illogical 
(natural selection cannot, on account of the second law of thermodynamics, 
create order out of disorder; mutations cannot lead to improvements), 
contradicted by the scientific evidence (e.g. the fossil record shows human 
footprints alongside animals supposed by evolutionists to be long extinct), the 
product of special pleading (the early history of life would require life to arise 
from inorganic matter – a form of spontaneous generation; radioactive dating 
makes huge assumptions about the constancy of natural processes over 
aeons of time), the product of those who ridicule the word of God (e.g. 
Richard Dawkins, Steve Jones) and a cause of a number of social evils 
(eugenics, Marxism, Nazism, racism) – e.g. Heinze (1973), Hall & Hall (1975), 
Watson (1975), White (1978), Hayward (1985), Baker (2003) and articles too 
many to mention in the journals and other publications of the Biblical Creation 
Society, the Creation Science Movement and other like-minded organisations. 
 
By and large, creationism has received similarly short shrift from those who 
accept the theory of evolution. In a fairly early study the philosopher of 
science Philip Kitcher argued that “in attacking the methods of evolutionary 
biology, Creationists are actually criticizing methods that are used throughout 
science” (Kitcher, 1982: 4-5). He concluded that the flat-earth theory, the 
chemistry of the four elements, and mediaeval astrology “have just as much 
claim to rival current scientific views as Creationism does to challenge 
evolutionary biology” (Kitcher, 1982: 5). A more trenchant attack on 
creationism is provided by geologist Ian Plimmer whose book title Telling Lies 
for God: Reason vs Creationism (Plimmer, 1994) accurately sums up the line 
he takes. An historical analysis is provided by philosopher of science Michael 
Ruse (and see Numbers & Stenhouse, 2000) who, while passionately 
critiquing creationism and defending evolution, is acerbic about those 
evolutionists who deride all religious belief and those theologians who are 
attracted to non-Darwinian understandings of life: 
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And given the threat that creationists pose to evolutionists of all kinds, it 
behoves evolutionists especially to start thinking about working together 
with Christian evolutionists, rather than apart. For a start, atheists like 
Dawkins and Coyne might consider taking a serious look at 
contemporary Christian theology (or the theology of other faiths, for that 
matter), rather than simply parroting the simplistic, schoolboy travesties 
of religion on which their critiques are founded. Conversely, Christians 
like Ward and Rolston might be encouraged to dig more deeply into 
modern, professional evolutionary biology and to start to get some 
understanding of its strengths and triumphs before they case around for 
alternatives like self-organization. 
(Ruse, 2005: 274) 
 
Many scientists and others have defended evolutionary biology from 
creationism – see, for example, the various contributions in Selkirk & Burrows 
(1987), Good et al. (1992), Manson (2003) and Jones & Reiss (in press) and 
an increasing number of agreed statements by scientists on the teaching of 
evolution (e.g. Interacademy Panel on International Issues, 2006). The main 
points that are frequently made are that evolutionary biology is good science 
in that not all science consists of controlled experiments where the results can 
be collected within a short period of time; that creationism (including „scientific 
creationism‟) isn‟t really a science in that its ultimate authority is scriptural and 
theological rather than the evidence obtained from the natural world; and that 
an acceptance of evolution is fully compatible with a religious faith, an 
assertion most often made in relation to Christianity (e.g. Southgate et al., 
2005) since it is more obviously true of many other religions – including 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism – and rather less true of Islam (Mabud, 
1991; Negus, 2005). For USA data about scientists‟ religious beliefs at 
different times see Larson & Witham (1999). 
 
 
GENETIC ENGINEERING 
 
21 
The science/religion issue in biology is so often seen only through the lens of 
the evolution/creationism issue that it is worth spending some time on a very 
different issue: the acceptability or otherwise of genetic engineering. The 
intention here is not to launch into an overview of religious understandings of 
morality but to show how many religions view creation (used here in a wider 
sense than in some secular cosmologies to mean both „the original creation‟ 
and „that which exists today‟ – and including therefore animals, plants and the 
environment as well as humans) as having a particular status that has 
implications for science and technology. 
 
The simplest and a well-established theological response to the question of 
how humans should relate to the rest of creation is that we should leave well 
alone: 
 
When you start playing around with genes, you're playing God. I don't 
think we have enough experience to play God. We need a little humility. 
It seems to be in short supply these days. 
(Brower, 1987/1988: 249) 
 
The difficulty with this argument is that it invites us to raise the question 
„What's so special about genetic engineering?‟ (Reiss & Straughan, 1996). 
For the same argument could be raised against any new technology. 
Scientists and technologists can never guarantee that a new process or 
product is totally safe. 
 
Of course, specific religious objections to genetic engineering can be raised. 
Indeed the phrase „playing God‟ in the above quotation provides one of them 
and such fears about human hubris or arrogance in trespassing upon divine 
territory go back at least as far as the religious beliefs of the Ancient Greeks. 
These objections will not be answered by extrinsic considerations such as 
assurances of safety or promises about the ultimate benefits of genetic 
engineering. Similar objections were raised in the nineteenth century when 
the first anaesthetics were developed and, of course, some religious 
believers, notably Christian Scientists, refuse medical help to this day. 
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Nevertheless, most other religious believers have reached different views, 
and nowadays accept the benefits of modern medicine, combining a trust in 
medicine with their religious faith, and seeing medicine as a gift of God. 
 
Indeed, if „playing God‟ includes breeding plants that could never have arisen 
in the wild, then almost everyone, with the possible exception of some 
aboriginal tribespeople, either plays God or benefits from someone who has. 
All of the world‟s crop plants, to say nothing of domesticated animals, are the 
products of thousands of years of artificial selection. It is inconceivable that 
the human race could go back to a pre-agricultural existence. Anyway, 
„playing God‟ cannot be restricted to the domestication of animals and plants. 
Presumably it must also logically include a tremendous range of human 
achievements from the synthesis of medical drugs to the invention of 
electricity. 
 
Traditionally a strong strand within certain religions, particularly Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, has viewed the created order as having been created 
for human ends. In Genesis Adam and Eve are told „Be fruitful and increase, 
fill the earth and subdue it, rule over the fish in the sea, the birds of heaven, 
and every living thing that moves upon the earth‟ (Genesis 1.28). It is difficult 
for us to reconstruct with certainty how verses such as this one were first 
understood. There is little doubt, however, that the understanding that 
humans were created in „the image of God‟ (Genesis 1.27) led many people 
to feel that they were set over nature and had authority to do with it pretty 
much as they liked. Certainly, the expectation, particularly within some 
Christian traditions, of life after death, an immanent Apocalypse and the 
advent of „a new heaven and a new earth‟ (Revelation 21.1) makes it easy for 
some people to feel that they can ignore the needs of the rest of the created 
order and simply use this world for their ends. However, the notion that 
humans can exploit the whole of the rest of the created order for their own 
ends is relatively uncommon in religions. More commonly, religions agree that 
humans have, at the very least, a responsibility as to how they use the 
creation, a view reflected in what is often seen as the creation mandate for 
responsible stewardship. 
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In Hinduism, the world's oldest major religion, all life is sacred. Visnu, as 
supreme being, endlessly creates the worlds of matter and withdraws it into 
his existence time after time as the cycle of seasons endlessly repeats itself 
(Prime, 1992; Chapple, 1994). In the Vedic literatures mother Earth is 
personified as the goddess Bhumi, or Prithvi, the abundant mother who 
showers her mercy on her children. It is not surprising that Hinduism views 
humanity as having a great responsibility towards the Earth: 
 
According to the Isa Upanishad, this planet does not belong to humanity, 
any more than it belongs to the other species living on it: 
 
Everything in the universe belongs to the Lord. You should 
therefore only take what is really necessary for yourself, which is 
set aside for you. You should not take anything else, because you 
know to whom it belongs. 
 
So long as we treat the planet carefully and take only our share, 
acknowledging that it and everything else belongs to God, the planet will 
provide for our needs; but as soon as we try to take nature's gifts without 
offering anything in return we become no better than thieves. 
(Prime, 1992: 32) 
 
In Judaism too there is a strong emphasis on the responsibilities that humans 
have towards nature. Agricultural land was supposed to lie fallow every 
seventh year as a “sabbath of sacred rest” (Leviticus 25.4). Further, every fifty 
years, on the Day of Atonement in the Jubilee Year, all land must return to its 
original owner. Because the Earth is the Lord‟s, no one has unconditional land 
rights (Leviticus 25.23). 
 
It should not be thought that the understanding in Judaism of the need for 
human stewardship is entirely a modern phenomenon. In the twelfth century 
of the common era, the Jewish scholar Abraham ibn Ezra said of Psalm 
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115.16 (“The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, and he gave the earth to 
people”): 
 
The ignorant have compared man‟s rule over the earth with God‟s rule 
over the heavens. This is not right, for God rules over everything. The 
meaning of „he gave it to the people‟ is that man is God‟s steward (paqid 
– officer or official with special responsibility for a specific task) over the 
earth, and must do everything according to God's word. 
(Rose, 1992: 27) 
 
In Buddhism there is a very strong emphasis on how we should relate to the 
natural world (Brown, 2004). Although Buddhism exists in many different 
forms, human responsibility towards the creation is a common theme, though 
the word „creation‟ is somewhat inappropriate as the Buddha taught that there 
is no creator God as the first cause, because there is no beginning. While 
Buddhism teaches that humans, unlike other creatures, have the opportunity 
to realise enlightenment, it does not teach that humanity is superior to the rest 
of the natural world. Indeed, the doctrine of „emptiness‟ in Buddhism, as 
originally developed by the philosopher Nagarjuna, in asserting that all things 
are empty simply denies that anything can exist on its own (Batchelor & 
Brown, 1992; Grosnick, 1994). 
 
The Chinese Buddhists, in particular, emphasised the intimate connections 
between all things. This philosophy found a more concrete expression in the 
Zen tradition. For instance, the Japanese Zen master Dogen says: 
 
It is not only that there is water in the world, but there is a world in 
water. It is not just water. There is also a world of living things in 
clouds. There is a world of living things in the air. There is a world of 
living things in fire. There is a world of living things on earth. There is a 
world of living things in the phenomenal world. There is a world of living 
things in a blade of grass. There is a world of living things in one staff. 
Whenever there is a world of living things, there is a world of Buddha 
ancestors. You should examine the meaning of this. 
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(Tanahashi, 1988: 106-107) 
 
In similar vein the Vietnamese monk and poet Thich Nhat Hanh writes: 
 
When we look at a chair, we see the wood, but we fail to observe the 
tree, the forest, the carpenter, or our own mind. When we meditate on 
it, we can see the entire universe in all its interwoven and 
interdependent relations in the chair. The presence of the wood reveals 
the presence of the tree. The presence of the leaf reveals the presence 
of the sun. The presence of the apple blossoms reveals the presence 
of the apple. Meditators can see the one in many, and the many in one. 
Even before they see the chair, they can see its presence in the heart 
of living reality. The chair is not separate. It exists only in its 
interdependent relations with everything else in the universe. It is 
because all other things are. If it is not, then all others are not either. 
(Thich Nhat Hanh, 1988: 90) 
 
A related theme, that of stewardship, is a significant theme in much of the 
writing on the environmental in Christianity (Bradley, 1990; WCC, 1990; 
DeWitt, 1994), Islam (Qur'an 2.204-206; 24.41; 30.30; Khalid & O'Brien, 1992) 
and other religions (Smart, 1989; Hinnells, 1991). Narrowly understood, 
stewardship, as a view of how humans should relate to the rest of the natural 
world, still implies something of a „them‟ (the rest of the natural world) versus 
„us‟ (humans) perspective. However, there is a more holistic view of our 
relationship to the rest of creation. This relationship can be described as one 
of mutuality, reflecting the biological understanding that a relationship is 
mutual if it benefits both partners. The word „mutuality‟ is therefore intended to 
avoid overtones of hierarchy and superiority. 
 
George Herbert (1593-1633), the Anglican priest and poet, saw the 
relationship of humanity to the rest of the created order as one of a priest to 
his flock: 
 
Man is the worlds High Priest: he doth present 
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The sacrifice for all: while they below 
Unto the service mutter an assent, (Providence) 
 
In like vein, Arthur Peacocke has explored related metaphors for our 
relationship to the rest of creation, including humanity as prophets of creation, 
lovers of creation or fellow-sufferers with it (Peacocke, 1979). 
 
One reason, then, for rejecting genetic engineering is that it involves too 
exploitative a view not just of animals but of all of nature. This point is made 
by K. S. Satagopan: 
 
Nature has its own genetic techniques which is borne by the change 
from Amoeba to men. But man's attempt to speed up change or to 
bring about important changes in specific ways and forms is very 
different. It is violence since it is against ecology. All Indian religions 
(Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism) are against violence, implicitly or 
explicitly. From a theoretical point of view Indian religions cannot have 
anything favourable to say about genetic engineering. 
(Satagopan, pers comm.) 
 
This view echoes Martin Heidegger's argument that in technology we make 
objects according to some blueprint that we determine. We design things to 
satisfy our purposes rather than allow our purposes to be affected by, and find 
creative expression through, the qualities of the objects themselves 
(Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger's point is even more salutary when applied to 
genetically engineered organisms. 
 
However, perhaps the most frequent response by religious writers to the issue 
of genetic engineering is one of caution or hesitancy (e.g. Rollin, 2005), 
increasingly informed by both theological and scientific analysis (e.g. Deane-
Drummond, 1997; Bruce & Bruce, 1998; Deane-Drummond, 2001). Caroline 
Berry, for example, writes: 
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The issues facing Christians are related ... to the tensions that arise as 
we discover more of our genetic make up and apply that to the 
workaday world: 
 
the tension between seeing a person as the sum of their genes 
and as being someone made in the image of God and for whom 
Christ died; 
 
the tension between wanting the best for our children and 
accepting them as they are, with their abilities or disabilities, 
whether mild or severe - we must continue to see children as 
gifts from God rather than assets to be acquired; 
 
the tension between the individual and their right to privacy and 
autonomy and the needs of society as a whole; 
 
tensions between commercial profits, the expense of research 
and our knowledge that a large proportion of the world's 
population are in need of food and clean water. 
(Berry, 1992, 5-6) 
 
In particular, some people may hesitate about the movement of genes 
between humans and other species, fearing that this somehow diminishes the 
distinctiveness of being human. For example, the notion that humans are 
made imago Dei may cause some with a Christian faith to feel uncomfortable 
about a technology that may threaten to blur the dividing line between 
humans and the rest of the created order (Reiss, 2003).  
 
Finally, there are religious writers who accept genetic engineering, though 
typically with certain specific caveats. Phil Challis writes: 
 
We are co-creators with God, "fearfully and wonderfully made" 
(Ps139:14). With our finite freedom we are called by Him to act 
responsibly as we continue the process of genetic manipulation of 
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domestic organisms. A theology that emphasises embodiment rather 
than body-spirit dichotomy, that emphasises becoming rather than 
immutability as an essential part of God's nature, that emphasises 
relationship within the web rather than domination from outside the 
system, such a christian theology may provide a critical framework that 
can realistically embrace the potential of genetic engineering for good. 
(Challis, 1992: 39-40) 
 
Ronald Cole-Turner (1993) has explored the implications of a distinction 
between humans as co-creators with God – a concept which, he feels, 
contains a number of difficulties – and humans as participants, through 
genetic engineering, in redemption. Here redemption is being used in the 
sense of 'restoration'. The idea is that genetic engineering can help to 
overcome genetic defects caused by harmful mutations. In this way genetic 
engineering can help to restore creation to a fuller, richer existence and can, 
Cole-Turner maintains, play an important role without encroaching on the 
scope of divine activity. 
 
 
THE WRITINGS OF RICHARD DAWKINS 
 
It may appear somewhat unbalanced to highlight one particular author in an 
article on how science educators should deal with the science/religion issue 
but in many countries, particularly English-speaking ones, Richard Dawkins‟ 
writings have had an especial influence. (At the time of writing, “richard 
dawkins” in Google generates about 50% more results than “david cameron” 
– leader of the official government opposition, the Conservative Party, in the 
UK – and almost 100 times as many as “johnny wilkinson” – who kicked the 
drop goal that won England the 2003 Rugby Union World Cup.) His 
importance for the science/religion issue stems from at least two features: the 
clarity with which he expounds the power of science; and the increasing 
vehemence with which he denounces religion. 
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For Dawkins, science is a wonderful way of seeing the world. His book 
Unweaving the Rainbow (Dawkins, 1998) is a celebration of how science 
helps us to see the world more clearly and in ways that previous generations 
could not have imagined. In a memorable passage in another of his books, he 
illustrates this when he writes: 
 
It is raining DNA outside. On the bank of the Oxford canal at the bottom 
of my garden is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into 
the air. There is no consistent air movement, and the seeds are drifting 
outwards in all directions from the tree. Up and down the canal, as far as 
my binoculars can reach, the water is white with floating cottony flecks, 
and we can be sure that they have carpeted the ground to much the 
same radius in other directions too. The cotton wool is mostly made of 
cellulose, and it dwarfs the tiny capsule that contains the DNA, the 
genetic information. The DNA content must be a small proportion of the 
total, so why did I say that it was raining DNA rather than cellulose? The 
answer is that it is the DNA that matters. The cellulose fluff, although 
more bulky, is just a parachute, to be discarded. The whole 
performance, cotton wool, catkins, tree and all, is in aid of one thing and 
one thing only, the spreading of DNA around the countryside. Not just 
any DNA, but DNA whose coded characters spell out specific 
instructions for building willow trees that will shed a new generation of 
downy seeds. Those fluffy specks are, literally, spreading instructions for 
making themselves. They are there because their ancestors succeeded 
in doing the same. It is raining instructions out there; it‟s raining 
programs; it‟s raining tree-growing, fluff-spreading, algorithms. That is 
not a metaphor, it is the plain truth. It couldn‟t be plainer if it were raining 
floppy discs. 
(Dawkins, 1986/1988: 111) 
 
But Dawkins, as is well known, is not content to laud science. He attacks, and 
with increasing virulence in recent years, religion (e.g. Dawkins, 2006). In a 
memorable phrase he has described religion as a „virus‟, infecting one mind 
after another so that it can thrive, careless of the havoc it reeks, indifferent to 
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the falsehoods it spreads. Some of his fellow evolutionary biologists have 
wondered precisely why he is so vehement and there is perhaps at least a 
hint in an essay he first had published in 1993 and which is reprinted as 
„Viruses of the mind‟ in a book dedicated to his daughter, Juliet, on her 
eighteenth birthday: 
 
A beautiful child close to me, six and the apple of her father‟s eye, 
believes that Thomas the Tank Engine really exists. She believes in 
Father Christmas, and when she grows up her ambition is to be a tooth 
fairy. She and her schoolfriends believe the solemn word of respected 
adults that tooth fairies and Father Christmases really exist. This little girl 
is of an age to believe whatever you tell her. If you tell her about witches 
changing princes into frogs, she will believe you. If you tell her that bad 
children roast forever in hell, she will have nightmares. I have just 
discovered that without her father‟s consent this sweet, trusting, gullible 
six-year-old is being sent, for weekly instruction, to a Roman Catholic 
nun. What chance has she? 
(Dawkins, 1993/2003/2004: 151) 
 
As one might expect, there have been a number of theological responses to 
Dawkins. Among science educators, Michael Poole has argued that Dawkins 
misunderstands much of what it is that religions claim and confuses the 
different meanings of „explanation‟ (Poole, 1994, 2002). Among theologians, 
John Bowker devoted his 1992-93 Gresham lectures to the question „Is God a 
Virus?‟ (Bowker, 1995) – the short answer, for Bowker, is „No‟ – while Alister 
McGrath has written two books on Dawkins‟ theology (McGrath, 2005; 
McGrath with McGrath, 2007). Perhaps unsurprisingly from a professor of 
historical theology, albeit someone with a PhD in molecular biophysics, 
McGrath finds that Dawkins‟ writings about religious faith fall far short of his 
standards when writing about biology. For example, Dawkins is fond of 
criticising religious faith as „blind trust‟ and likening it to belief in Father 
Christmas or the Tooth Fairy, yet, as McGrath puts it: 
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There is no serious empirical evidence that people regard God, Santa 
Claus, and the Tooth Fairy as being in the same category. I stopped 
believing in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy when I was about six years 
old. After being an atheist for some years, I discovered God when I was 
eighteen, and have never regarded this as some kind of infantile 
regression. As I noticed while researching The Twilight of Atheism, a 
large number of people come to believe in God in later life – when they 
are “grown up.” I have yet to meet anyone who came to believe in Santa 
Claus or the Tooth Fairy late in life. 
(McGrath, 2005: 87) 
 
It ought, though, to be pointed out that there are extremely large numbers of 
intelligent, (otherwise) rational and normal USA citizens who have come to 
believe that as adults they were kidnapped by aliens, painfully experimented 
on and then returned to Earth (Clancy, 2005).  
 
 
PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES 
 
A lot of the science education literature simply treats the science/religion issue 
as problematic. However, a number of studies have tried to find effective ways 
of teaching in this area. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most are to do with 
evolutionary biology though there are some in other areas of science, 
principally cosmology and geology (e.g. Poole, 1995; Science and Religion in 
Schools Project, 2006). 
 
Several studies have investigated or advocate the use of role play, one 
advantage of which is that it can allow one the opportunity to act out another‟s 
point of view. Jon Duveen and Joan Solomon used a role play for 15-16 year-
olds based on a fictitious trial for blasphemy of On the Origin of Species and 
note that “Not only do students learn science but they also learn about 
science” (Duveen & Solomon, 1994: 581). Similarly, Smith (1994) 
recommended that the nature of science be explicitly addressed while Bentley 
(2000) successfully used a simulation/improvisation activity for his own pre-
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service science education students and for in-service workshops based on a 
fictitious debate at a School Board as to whether evolution should be 
presented as „just a theory‟. Helgeson et al. (2002) introduced pre-service 
teachers to issues surrounding evolution and creationism via a mock trial and 
found gains in students‟ understanding of evolutionary principles and 
awareness of the difficulties of balancing evolutionism and creationism in 
science pedagogy. 
 
Others have emphasised the value of using the evolution/creationism 
controversy as a way of emphasising science as a process of critical thinking 
(Skehan & Nelson, 2000; several contributors to Campbell & Meyer, 2003). 
This, of course, requires some consideration of the arguments of creationism 
which can (and quite often does) lead to alarm among scientists and others, 
fearful of creationism being „taught‟ in science. For example, Clough 
maintains: 
 
The corollary to the argument for teaching biological evolution is 
obviously that “scientific” creationism should not be given any credibility 
in science courses because it is not considered to be good science by 
the scientific enterprise. 
(Clough, 1994: 409) 
 
Other studies entail getting students to discuss whether humans are still 
evolving (Shields, 2004) and providing high school students with opportunities 
to reason like evolutionary biologists (Passmore et al., 2005) 
 
One of the most interesting studies is that of Shipman et al. (2002). This study 
drew on Cobern‟s worldview theory (Cobern, 1996) and the approach of 
conceptual ecology (Toulmin, 1972) to develop and implement “a modest 
inclusion of science and religion” (p.530) in a college astronomy course at the 
University of Delaware. The general approach of the instructor (Harry 
Shipman) was: 
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To recognize that students may be coming at this issue from a diversity 
of religious viewpoints … his basic approach to the issue [was] one of 
humility, of tolerance of as many religious viewpoints as is possible, 
given the constraints of the scientific evidence … He publicly 
acknowledged that many theistic scientists can believe in God, 
evolution, and the Big Bang at the same time, and he briefly discussed 
the consequences of such a belief. 
(Shipman et al., 2002, p.530) 
 
As one might expect, the students differed greatly both before and after the 
course in terms of how they saw the science/religion issue. However, what is 
noteworthy is that there was almost no hostility resulting from the introduction 
of the science and religion element while the majority of the students (120 out 
of 202) agreed strongly or agreed with the statement “As a result of taking this 
course, I understand more about the relationship between science and 
religion/philosophy”, with only 33 disagreeing. 
 
Whether or not it is appropriate to teach students in science classes about the 
nature of religious knowledge as well as the nature of scientific knowledge is 
likely to vary from country to country (cf. Kawasaki, 1996; National Academy 
of Sciences, 1999), from time to time, from school to school, and even from 
teacher to teacher within a school (Reiss, in press). The strongest argument, 
in my view, for teaching anything about religion in a science class, whether at 
school, college or university, is if it helps students better to understand 
science. I am not here, therefore, addressing the more general question as to 
whether students should be taught in schools or college about religion for 
other reasons (e.g. that students should be introduced to the various domains 
of knowledge, one of which is religious knowledge with its distinctive claims, 
or because teaching about religion helps one better understand history or 
morality). 
 
Teaching about aspects of religion in science classes could potentially help 
students better understand the strengths and limitations of the ways in which 
science is undertaken, the nature of truth claims in science, and the 
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importance of social contexts for science. However, there are also reasons to 
be cautious before teaching about aspects of religion in science classes 
(Reiss, 1992). For example, a science teacher might feel that they simply 
don‟t have the expertise to teach effectively about such matters (though my 
experience and that of others is that initial teacher education and continuing 
professional development can help address this need), that these matters are 
better dealt with elsewhere in the curriculum (in some cases co-operation with 
other subject departments can be fruitful), or that it is impossible to teach 
objectively about such matters so that one risks indoctrinating one‟s students 
either into or away from a religious faith. In addition, there can be legal 
restraints on the extent to which religion can be discussed in classes and, 
more mundanely, there are frequently the constraints of curriculum time. 
 
One approach that I have found to be of worth in science classes with 
undergraduates training to be science teachers is, when teaching about the 
nature of science, to get them to think about the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and religious knowledge. What seems to work well is to 
ask students, either on their own or in pairs, to illustrate this by means of a 
drawing, and then for all of us in the class to discuss the various drawings that 
result. See, for example, the hypothetical representation in Figure 1. A person 
producing the representation in Figure 1 sees both religious and scientific 
knowledge as existing but envisages the scope of religious knowledge as 
being smaller than that of scientific knowledge and of there being no overlap 
between the two. 
 
A number of science educators favour a clear-cut distinction between religious 
and scientific knowledge, along the lines of that defended by Gould (1999). 
There are a number of advantages to such a position. For example, it allows a 
person with a strong religious belief who might otherwise be troubled by 
certain aspects of science to avoid possible conflict (and vice versa) and it 
provides an epistemological justification for why religious matters should not 
be examined in science classes, which is useful in a country such as the USA 
that prohibits the teaching of religion in public [i.e. state in the UK sense of the 
term] schools. 
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However, there are many for whom scientific knowledge and religious 
knowledge are not distinct. At one end are those who draw religious 
knowledge as being much smaller than scientific knowledge and wholly or 
partly contained within it (Figure 2); at the other are those whose worldview is 
predominantly religious (Figure 3). Understandings of the relationship(s) 
between science and religion vary greatly, at least in part because of 
considerable variation in how people conceptualise both science and religion 
(Brooke, 1991). The visual metaphor in Figures 1, 2 and 3 can be taken too 
far but it can serve as a useful heuristic device. 
 
 
Teaching about controversial issues 
 
A widely accepted definition of a controversial issue is that “A matter is 
controversial if contrary views can be held on it without those views being 
contrary to reason” (Dearden, 1984: 86). Most people would agree that the 
science/religion issue is controversial both according to this definition and to 
the commonsense understanding of the term „controversial‟, though we can 
note that Dearden‟s definition is really a definition of „uncertainty‟. Controversy 
surely requires that some significance be attached to the uncertainty. For 
example, there is uncertainty about many matters in geography (the precise 
heights of mountains, the sources of rivers, etc.) but little or no controversy 
attaches to many (though not all) such uncertainties. 
 
For someone to say that an issue is controversial is not to mean that they 
themselves necessarily consider it controversial – they may hold that the 
matter is completely uncontroversial – but that a range of views can be held 
on it by people without those views being unreasonable. So, for example, the 
teaching of sex education, whether we should have capital punishment and 
the significance of global climate change are all controversial whereas the 
value of , the outcome of the Second World War and whether slavery is 
desirable are not. 
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Furthermore, an issue may be controversial at one time but not at another – 
slavery was certainly controversial in the middle of the nineteenth century 
even if it is not so now (despite the fact that it still occurs in parts of the world) 
and I suspect that the significance of global climate change will become less 
controversial (but more important) as the years go by – and it is easier for us 
today than it was in Dearden‟s time to see that a matter may be controversial 
for some people but not others. After all, the science/religion issue is not 
controversial, merely exasperating, to Peter Atkins (Atkins, 1992) and Richard 
Dawkins. A more general point is that controversy is often neither entirely 
absent nor completely present; there are degrees of controversy. 
 
Importantly, a matter can be controversial without it being scientifically 
controversial. There are very few professional scientists for whom the young 
Earth hypothesis (i.e. that the Earth is some 10,000 or fewer years old; at any 
rate, orders of magnitude younger than the widely accepted figure among 
professional scientists of around 4,600 million years) is scientifically 
controversial: it is simply judged to be wrong. In the same way, there are very 
few professional scientists for whom the theory of evolution (in the sense that 
all life today is presumed to derive from extremely simple ancestors and 
ultimately from inorganic materials) is a controversial part of science. 
However, this last example illustrates the fact that a scientific theory may not 
be controversial even though aspects of it are. For example, precisely how life 
evolved from inorganic materials is still very unclear and there is at least some 
degree of controversy about such matters as the relative importance attached 
to natural selection versus other agents of evolutionary change, how long it 
typically takes for a new species to arise and many, many details of the 
history of life – how one group of organisms evolved into another being chief 
amongst these, though we are learning more (e.g. about the origins of whales, 
bats and the earliest land animals) all the time. 
 
Would one want explicitly to teach about creationism in science lessons? Both 
the knee-jerk and the considered reaction from most scientists and science 
educators has been „no‟. Here my interest in not in the legal situation that 
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obtains in any one country – carefully discussed with reference to the USA by 
Randy Moore in a series of papers culminating in Moore (in press) – nor in the 
undoubted demands that teaching in this area can place on teachers (Griffith 
& Brem, 2004) but in whether it would desirable on educational grounds to 
teach about creationism in science lessons. Given the preceding paragraph, I 
would not want any such teaching, were it to occur, to give the impression that 
creationism and the theory of evolution are equally valid scientifically. They 
are not (and nor is it appropriate to insist on spending equal amounts of time 
on evolution and creationism in science lessons). 
 
However, I do not belong to the camp that argues that creationism is 
necessarily non-scientific. For all that I have no doubt that the overwhelming 
majority of those who believe in creationism (and intelligent design theory) do 
so because of their religious beliefs it is logically possible to hold that 
evolution (sensu major anatomical, physiological, genetic and biochemical 
changes in organisms over long periods of time) has not happened. I can 
conceive of a world in which the earliest fossils indicate creatures as 
complicated as ourselves and in which the same geological strata show 
human and dinosaur footprints. Indeed, I very much favour students 
examining the evidence for evolution in a critical manner. 
 
Furthermore, I am not convinced that something being „non-scientific‟ is 
sufficient to disqualify it from being considered in a science lesson. An 
understanding of (non-scientific) context often helps in learning the content of 
science, partly by motivating the learner, partly by indicating why the content 
is meaningful and partly by rendering the content more intelligible. Indeed, the 
distinction between context and content can be more blurred in the biological 
and earth sciences than in physics and chemistry. When a student learns 
about the cellular mechanisms and genetic principles that underlie cystic 
fibrosis, is cystic fibrosis at least in part the content or merely the context for 
membrane transport and inheritance? As far as evolution is concerned, 
stories about, for example, the voyage of The Beagle or the domestication of 
pigeons can simply be motivating for students or can also help clarify the 
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thinking that Darwin went through, thus enabling students themselves better 
to understand the science. 
 
An additional point is that much of the debate about the teaching of evolution 
is still situated, albeit implicitly, in a view of education in which the teacher has 
complete control over that which enters each student‟s mind about the issue 
in question. Such a view has been outmoded for years. If one turns from 
considering that which is taught to that which is learned, it immediately 
becomes clear that students have always (and nowadays possibly more than 
ever) learned outside of formal lessons and from people (including family) and 
other sources in addition to their prescribed textbooks. 
 
This leads onto the more general point about how one should teach about 
controversial issues in science. The short answer is that one should do so in a 
way that respects evidence and valid reasoning, that helps students to 
understand which aspects of an issue are controversial and which are not 
(e.g. with reference to global warming it is not controversial that atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels are rising, there is a small, though decreasing, degree of 
controversy attached to the role of humans in this, and there is still 
considerable controversy as to the impact that this rise will have for humans 
and other species). 
 
As to the precise techniques one can employ when teaching a controversial 
issue, there are many (e.g. Wellington, 1986). I have tried, in addition to other 
approaches (e.g. advocacy and affirmative neutrality), the approach of 
procedural neutrality (in which the teacher acts as a facilitator but does not try 
to steer the debate in any particular direction). Graduate science students 
doing a one-year course to become specialist science teachers were 
presented with a wide range of materials detailing how Darwin‟s On the Origin 
of Species By Means of Natural Selection was received after its publication on 
24 November 1859. The students then divided themselves into four groups 
and desk-top published the front page of a newspaper of that time reacting to 
Darwin‟s book. One group produced The Times which, though it discussed 
the book, gave pride of place to Garibaldi‟s campaign in Italy. Another group 
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produced Nature which, though generally positive about the book, stressed 
the controversy caused in the scientific establishment. A third group produced 
The Church Times which gave pride of place to Lord Wilberforce‟s scientific 
assessment of Darwin‟s theory. Finally, the fourth group formed a feminist 
workers‟ co-operative and produced a tabloid called The Splurge. Their lead 
story was headed “All Men are Apes/ It‟s Official!!!”. 
 
 
Teaching about matters of personal significance 
 
Even if one agrees that there are aspects of the science/religion issue that 
can or should validly be taught in science lessons, this is not to minimize the 
fact that teaching about this relationship is, for many, a matter of considerable 
personal significance. Teaching about a matter of personal significance is 
related to but not identical to teaching about a controversial issue. To teach 
about matters of personal significance can demand much of us as teachers. It 
exposes aspects of ourselves to our students in a way which many teachers 
will find threatening or invasive, though some may find exciting. There are 
parallels to teaching about ourselves as sexual beings when teaching sex 
education – a dangerous state of affairs and one that I caution new entrants to 
the teaching profession to avoid, at the least for their own sakes. 
 
Equally, teaching about matters of personal significance can make significant 
demands on students (Jackson et al., 1995; Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; 
Roth & Alexander, 1997; Downie & Barron, 2000). We need to find ways that 
are respectful of students, that neither threaten their beliefs nor molly coddle 
them as if getting them to think about their beliefs was necessarily to attack 
them. In England and Wales, a course for 16-19 year-olds that I direct, titled 
Salters-Nuffield Advanced Biology, has been running in a pilot version since 
September 2002 and nationally since September 2005. One of the learning 
objectives in the topic on evolution and ecology is “Appreciate why, for cultural 
reasons, the theory of evolution has been so controversial for some people” 
(Edexcel, 2005: 31). The reason for including this learning objective is 
because the team devising the course felt it worthwhile for 16-19 year-olds to 
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understand something about this issue Of course, the aim is neither to 
persuade students to embrace certain religious beliefs nor to cause them to 
abandon them: it is to help them learn and to clarify their thinking. The 
material in the student textbook that relates to this learning objective is quoted 
in Box 1. 
 
Almost everyone reading Box 1 can probably find something in it that they 
don‟t like. However, our purpose in writing it was to avoid shying away from 
the science/religion issue and to attempt to present material that would not be 
considered unfair or disrespectful by readers, whatever their own positions on 
the issue. There is an optional activity that teachers have available to help 
them when teaching this part of the course. This activity is a role play for 
students, and the student sheet that accompanies it is presented in Box 2. 
 
Part of the hope would be, as it often is with role plays, that undertaking this 
activity, and the subsequent classroom discussion, would help students better 
to understand one another and that this understanding might help them to 
respect views other than their own. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The science/religion issue generates a great deal of heat (Scharmann, 1993; 
Park, 2001; Allgaier, 2005; Gauld, 2005; Pigliucci, 2005; Skoog, 2005). I have 
examined here the nature of the issue both in general terms and with 
reference to particular topics. I have argued that there are good reasons for 
students being introduced to aspects of the science/religion issue in science 
lessons. Such teaching is not easy but done well it can be respectful of 
students, motivating and fulfilling for them and help them to learn more about 
the nature and content of science. 
 
At the same time, and finally, a great deal more work could profitably be 
undertaken in this area. A whole host of research questions suggest 
themselves. What precisely should be the aims of teaching in this area? Are 
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science/religion issues core or peripheral to science education? What are the 
best ways of addressing these issues in the science classroom? How much 
knowledge of religion does a science educator need? How great is the range 
of religions that might need to be addressed in the science classroom? What 
initial teacher education and continuing professional development in this area 
is most effective for science teachers? How much time (if any) should be 
spent on the science/religion issue and to what extent is the answer to this 
question dependent on the particular science educator? If the issue is to be 
addressed, what facets should be considered for different ages of students? 
 
Not all of these questions are empirical and of those that are, a range of 
methodologies can be envisaged (including ethnographic work, surveys, 
longitudinal research and action research). My hope is that future work will 
address these and related questions without losing sight of the twin truths that 
the main function of science education is to help students learn science and 
that for the majority of students who come to science lessons, science plays 
only a small part in their lives. 
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Figure 1 Hypothetical representation of how someone who sees both religious 
and scientific knowledge as existing but envisages the scope of religious 
knowledge as being smaller than that of scientific knowledge and of there 
being no overlap between the two might draw the relationship between 
religious knowledge (RK, left) and scientific knowledge (SK, right). 
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Figure 2 Hypothetical representation of how someone who sees religious 
knowledge as being much smaller than scientific knowledge and almost 
entirely contained within it might draw the relationship between religious 
knowledge (RK) and scientific knowledge (SK). 
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Figure 3 Hypothetical representation of how someone whose worldview is 
predominantly religious might draw the relationship between religious 
knowledge (RK) and scientific knowledge (SK). 
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Why is the theory of evolution controversial?  
 
Darwin had considered training to be a clergyman and knew that his ideas 
about evolution meant that he seemed to be challenging the Bible. The first 
two chapters of Genesis record how all of the Earth‟s organisms were created 
by God about 6000 to 10000 years ago, in much the form that they exist 
today. 
 
It is hard for many people to appreciate just how controversial Darwin‟s ideas 
were at the time. To this day there are many people in the world who cannot 
reconcile their religious beliefs and the theory of evolution. Few Muslims 
accept it and many Christians either reject or aren‟t comfortable with it either. 
In the UK around 10% of people are creationists. Creationists accept the 
literal teaching of the Bible, Qur‟an or other scriptures and reject the theory of 
evolution. Creationists believe, for example, that God specially created Adam 
and Eve out of the dust of the earth so that humans are quite distinct from all 
other species. In the USA around 40% of people are creationists. Indeed, 
worldwide there is no doubt that the idea that all organisms are descended 
from a common ancestor that lived some 3000 million years ago – which is 
what evolutionary biologists believe – is a minority position. 
 
The great majority of biologists, geologists and other scientists do accept a 
modernised version of evolution called neo-Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism 
combines Darwin‟s and Wallace‟s theory of natural selection with what we 
now know about inheritance. Many scientists who accept the theory of 
evolution in this modernised version also have firm religious beliefs. Such 
scientists have various ways of reconciling their religious beliefs with the 
theory of evolution. For example, they may believe that God created the 
original conditions that enabled the universe to come into existence, and then 
allowed evolution to take its course. In this understanding, God gives the 
whole of creation, including us, a certain freedom. Life is not predetermined 
but open ended. 
 
Box 1 Extract from the Salters-Nuffield Advanced Level course (Hall et al., 
2006: 51) 
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Activity 5.16 The controversial nature of the theory of evolution 
 
This activity gets you to engage in a discussion to help you understand why, 
for cultural reasons, the theory of evolution has been so controversial for 
some people. In groups you and your peers will engage in a modest role play 
in which you defend a range of positions with respect to the evolution-
creationism debate. Each of you will have one of the four roles outlined below. 
 
This may be an issue about which you have thought carefully or not at all. The 
aim of the activity is not necessarily to get you to change your own views but 
to appreciate how different people can hold different views on this issue. 
 
 
Atheist with a strong belief in evolutionary biology 
 
You have spent a reasonable amount of time thinking about religion and are 
certain that there is absolutely no truth in any religious claims. You are happy 
to describe yourself, if asked, as an atheist. You don‟t try and force your views 
on others but intensely dislike and consider wholly unjustified any attempt by 
someone with a religious faith to convert others to their point of view. 
 
You think the world would be a better place without religions. What you 
particularly dislike is the way in which religious people seem certain that their 
view is right. You are extremely dubious about the extent to which anyone 
with a religious faith can be a decent scientist. 
 
One of the exciting things about evolutionary biology, you feel, is the way in 
which it can explain, through natural selection, why people have a religious 
faith. You haven‟t had time to read the latest books on the subject but know 
that the authors argue that religions evolved to make people more likely to be 
altruistic and get along with their neighbours. This would have had survival 
value. 
 
 
Agnostic 
 
You haven‟t really given much thought as to whether there is a God or not and 
feel you have an open mind on the question. You rather wish more people 
were prepared to have an open mind about such matters as it seems to you 
that half the world‟s problems are caused by people being so certain about 
things of which they know rather little. 
 
 
Religious belief and belief in evolutionary biology 
 
You have a strong religious faith and are pretty sure that the conventional 
evolutionary biology account is correct. It rather frustrates you that most 
people seem unable to read the scriptures in any way other than the more 
literal fashion. Whether or not miracles occurred in the past they don‟t seem to 
nowadays much, if at all, and, anyway, the important thing about the 
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scriptures is not the miracles they describe but the way they point to the 
nature of God and to what it is to lead a flourishing life. 
 
You feel strongly that the combination of a strong religious faith and a belief in 
evolutionary biology is the best way to understand human nature. 
Evolutionary biology is concerned with factual questions of how life (including 
humans) evolved. Religion is concerned with ultimate questions of value and 
being. 
 
 
Creation scientist 
 
You have a strong religious faith and accept the scientific method. However, 
you don‟t think that the scientific evidence points to an old Earth; quite the 
opposite. You feel that the scientific account that makes the most sense is 
that life arose on Earth round about 10 000 years ago and soon after was 
almost totally destroyed by a giant flood. What science cannot do is to say 
why these events occurred: this is provided by scripture. 
 
You think that it is a really good idea for advanced level biology students to 
examine critically the evidence for evolution and feel confident that if they are 
given the time to do this, many of them will realise that evolution is confined to 
natural selection within species or possibly leading to the evolution of closely 
related species over a period of a few thousand years. 
 
 
Box 2 Extract from the Salters-Nuffield Advanced Level course 
(www.snabonline.com/; last accessed 16 April 2006; password protected). 
 
